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Introduction
Recognition of the extensive losses inflicted on
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpo-
ration (and thus indirectly on the taxpayers) by
the thrift industry crisis has led to increased scru-
tiny of the safety and soundness of commercial
banks and other financial institutions. It has
become obvious that some of the factors respon-
sible for excessive risk-taking by savings and
loans may also be relevant to commercial banks.
In particular, the current system of fixed-rate
deposit insurance and supervision and regula-
tion interacts in complex ways with the market
forces that may ordinarily discipline banks. An
understanding of these interactions is crucial to
financial institution reform.
This article reviews the literature relevant to
assessing one proposed regulatory reform —
increased capital requirements for banks. The
arguments for higher capital requirements rely
primarily on the premise that they will strengthen
market discipline, and secondarily on the desire to
provide a greater cushion for the deposit insurance
agency. In theory, increased capital requirements
can at least partially compensate for the weaken-
ing of market discipline that may result from the
continued presence of fixed-rate deposit insur-
ance. However, the magnitude of the impact of
past changes in capital requirements on banks'
capital decisions is unclear, mainly because mar-
ket forces also affect such decisions.
Any analysis of the impact of capital require-
ments must take into account the current system
of fixed-rate deposit insurance. The presence of
non-risk-related insurance premiums and govern-
ment guarantees influences the capital decision
by blunting the effect that increased capital-asset
ratios would otherwise have on banks' cost of
funds. The current system complicates identifying
the impact of changes in required capital-asset
ratios, because the subsidy itself may be influ-
enced by the ratios and other factors.
Fixed-rate insurance is also widely viewed
as subsidizing risk-taking, thus providing a ra-
tionale for capital regulation. In the absence of
government guarantees, shareholders would
need higher levels of capital as a buffer against
losses in order to avoid risk-related increases in
their cost of funds. These guarantees thus lead
to a substitution of deposits for equity, thereby
lowering capital ratios.
Although this distortion has led to reform pro-
posals that emphasize reductions in the scope of
government guarantees, proposals to increase
capital requirements continue to emerge despite
the introduction of risk-based requirements. This
has occurred in part because changes in capital
requirements are seen as relatively easy to imple-
ment. In addition, as noted above, capital
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risk more carefully and to submit to the market's
evaluation when they attempt to raise capital.
On the surface, capital requirements seem to
be effective, because almost all banks increase
their capital-asset ratios (book value) after the
requirements are increased. However, other fac-
tors may influence the ratios, especially if they
are calculated in terms of book value. For exam-
ple, suppose that the regulatory standards were
increased in response to a general market per-
ception that capital is inadequate. In this case,
the subsequent adjustment may be partly due to
banks' desire to avoid an increase in the risk
premium in their cost of funds. Clearly, in order
to disentangle such influences, investigators
must have a model of the factors that determine
bank capital-asset ratios.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. Section I reviews the theoretical litera-
ture on the determination of banks' capital struc-
ture. Section II covers a closely related topic, the
impact of capital requirements on portfolio risk.
Section III presents a model of a bank's choice of
capital structure. Section IV analyzes the model's
implications for the impact of market and regula-
tory forces on bank leverage.
1 Section V reviews
the empirical findings on the effects of capital
requirements, contrasting various results in terms
of the implications presented in section IV. Sec-





I first discuss the theoretical findings relevant to
nonfinancial corporations, since to some extent
these may extend to banks, and then review the
limited number of analyses of how and why the
capital structure decisions of banks may differ
from those of nonfinancial institutions.
2 I then
focus on specific analyses of banks' capital
structure, most of which assign a prominent
role to deposit insurance.
The literature analyzing the capital structure
decisions of nonfinancial corporations is so
broad as to defy easy description.
3 However,
one of the strongest conclusions to emerge from
the empirical studies is that optimal capital struc-
ture is influenced by the tax code, possibly in
combination with leverage-related costs. For
example, the ability of corporations to deduct
interest on debt may encourage an increase in
leverage. On the other hand, higher levels of non-
debt tax shields, such as depreciation and tax
credits, may reduce optimal leverage by increas-
ing the probability that not all interest expenses
will be deductible. Taxes on personal equity and
interest income may also decrease the net tax
advantage of debt and optimal leverage.
Leverage-related costs include the expected
costs of bankruptcy, and agency costs associated
with conflicts among creditors, stockholders, and
managers. The direct costs of bankruptcy are mini-
mal (mainly involving administrative and legal
fees), but agency costs, which include any decrease
in firm value associated with contractual arrange-
ments to protect one party from actions taken by
another party with conflicting interests, can be sig-
nificant. Bond covenants that restrict cash-flow
usage may impose agency costs. However, such
covenants may be a part of optimal contracts recon-
ciling bondholders with stockholders.
The theory of optimal financial structures for
financial intermediaries differs somewhat from
the theory for nonfinancial firms. First, in analyz-
ing capital structure for either financial or non-
financial firms, it is convenient to assume that
operating and financing decisions can be
separated. This assumption is harder to defend
for financial intermediaries. The existence of
complete markets, which makes separation
• 1 Leverage is often defined as the ratio between debt and equity,
measured in book or market values. In the model presented here, the bank
chooses the level of promised payments to depositors, given an exoge-
nous asset portfolio. This is equivalent to choosing the debt-to-equity
ratio directly. In Osterberg and Thomson's (1990) empirical study, the
measure of leverage is the ratio between the book value of debt and the
total of the book value of debt and the market value of equity. This is close
to another often-analyzed measure of leverage, the debt-to-asset ratio.
• 2 In this section, we review the theoretical analyses relevant to un-
derstanding the impact of changes in bank capital requirements. Because
few analyses of bank capital structure are available (relative to the number
that deal with the capital structure of nonfinancial institutions), it is not
useful to attempt to categorize various approaches. In addition, the dis-
similarities in approach prevent the development of a general model to
which all others specialize.
• 3 Among several useful surveys is one by Harris and Raviv (1990),
who categorize the forces that may influence capital structure into desires
to 1) ameliorate conflicts of interest, 2) convey private information to
markets, 3) influence product or input markets, and 4) affect corporate
control contests. The authors exclude tax-driven theories that they admit
are of great empirical importance. Although few analyses of the capital
structure of banks consider these four forces, several take into account
taxes and other considerations discussed here.
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tence of intermediaries: If markets were com-
plete, lenders and borrowers could transact
without them. In addition, deposits seem to play
a role in both the real and financial decisions of
banks, because deposits are not only an input
into banks' production, but a component of debt
in their capital structure. Another reason that
analyses of banks' capital structure differ is that
regulatory forces aimed directly at capital struc-
ture (for example, capital-asset ratios) must be
considered.
Although most studies of the impact of cap-
ital requirements on banks do not view these
institutions as fundamentally different from non-
financial entities, many others have examined
the role of informational asymmetries and con-
tracts in explaining the existence of intermedi-
aries. Early examples are Boyd and Prescott
(1986) and Diamond (1984). Sealey (1985) ana-
lyzes a model of incomplete markets and inter-
mediaries, showing the conditions under which
shareholder unanimity holds and under which
unanimity implies separation. Sealey (1983) ex-
amines a model of incomplete markets in which
economies of scale in the provision of deposit
services influence bank leverage. Chen, Doher-
ty, and Park (1988) utilize an option-pricing
framework to analyze the capital structure deci-
sions of depository financial intermediaries in
the presence of deposit insurance, reserve
requirements, liquidity effects, and taxation.
They conclude that no clear separation exists
between operating and financial decisions, and
that this finding even applies to analyses of the
impact of taxation on leverage decisions.
As noted in Santomero (1984), most studies
of bank capital structure assume that real and
financial decisions can be separated, and try to
explain leverage choice conditional on a given
portfolio of assets. One example is Orgler and
Taggart (1983), who show how personal and cor-
porate taxes, reserve requirements, and econ-
omies of scale influence intermediaries' optimal
leverage. Applications of the option-pricing
framework also assume that portfolio composi-
tion is held constant. Pyle (1986) shows that the
use of book values in capital regulation is inap-
propriate when combined with closure rules that
deviate from an economic solvency condition.
The conclusions of theoretical analyses of
the impact of capital requirements are closely
related to the treatment of deposit insurance and
government guarantees. If deposit insurance is
underpriced and unresponsive to risk, then stock-
holders are being subsidized by the insurer, and
the size of the subsidy is a function of portfolio
risk and leverage. This subsidy has a direct im-
pact on banks' responses to changes in capital
requirements. Buser, Chen, and Kane (1981) ex-
amine how the combination of capital regulation
and flat-rate deposit insurance jointly influences
bank leverage. They note that because capital
regulation encompasses more than just numerical
standards for capital-asset ratios, such regulation
can be seen as imposing an implicit risk-related
insurance premium that discourages banks from







Although most studies of bank capital structure
assume a given portfolio of assets, several
authors have examined the impact of capital re-
quirements on portfolio risk, assuming that
leverage is at the regulatory maximum.
4 An
overall assessment of the impact of capital re-
quirements on bank capital structure would
have to allow for possible feedback from varia-
tion in portfolio changes.
Koehn and Santomero (1980) conclude that
increased numerical capital requirements lead
banks that are risk-averse expected utility maxi-
mizers to reshuffle their portfolios so as to in-
crease the probability of bankruptcy. Lam and
Chen (1985) and Kim and Santomero (1988) use
similar approaches. Keeley and Furlong (1987),
who employ a value-maximization framework,
point out that Koehn and Santomero ignore the
impact of changes in leverage and portfolio risk
on the deposit insurance subsidy. Osterberg and
Thomson (1988) show how the impact of capi-
tal requirements on portfolio shares is altered
by allowing the cost of funds to be influenced
by leverage.
• 4 Flannery (1989) shows why insured banks may have a preference
for safe individual loans but still prefer risky overall portfolios. Capital ade-
quacy standards and loan examination procedures are key elements of his
analysis. Lucas and McDonald (1987) study the impact of capital regula-
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if Y < X
if 0 < X < Y
otherwise,
X = end-of-period value of bank assets,
Ys,Yb= gross end-of-period cash flows accruing to bank stockholders and depositors, respectively,
Y = total end-of-period promised payment to depositors,
<p = total end-of-period after-tax value of nondebt tax shields when fully utilized,
X = regulatory penalty,
8 = capital requirement,
k = cost of financial distress to depositors, and
d = proportion between 8 and Y (a capital requirement proxy).





To aid in this review, I present a model in which
market and regulatory influences on banks' cap-
ital structure are intertwined. The model also
provides a limited synthesis of the theoretical lit-
erature. However, influences that could explain
the existence of intermediaries, such as the pres-
ence of incomplete markets, are not incorporated.
The only factor included that distinguishes banks
is capital regulation. In addition, the model main-
tains the separation of real and financial decisions
by holding constant the bank's asset portfolio and
reairn variance. Although I initially assume that
there is no deposit insurance, such insurance is
easily introduced (see Osterberg and Thomson
[1990] and the following discussion).^
Equations (1) and (2) describe the uncertain
outcomes facing stockholders and depositors. I
view the bank as attempting to maximize the
total of the values of equity and deposits, each
of which depends on the uncertain outcomes
and their associated probabilities.
Pre-tax returns to stockholders depend on the
uncertain end-of-period value of bank assets, X.
The first line of equation (1) indicates the return
when income (asset values) is high enough that
the capital guideline is not violated. I assume in
this case that all nondebt tax shields can be util-
ized (X > Y+ q>/tc); however, the results are
not significantly affected by this assumption. In
the second case, when income is high enough
to use all the shields but the capital requirement
is not met (X[l- tc]+ y- Y < 8), regulators
impose a tax of X on stockholder returns. In the
third case, income is positive but insufficient to
utilize nondebt tax shields, and the guidelines
are not met.
• 5 This model is a variant of the one developed by Bradley, Jarrell,
and Kim (1984), hereafter referred to as BJK. Detailed assumptions un-
derlying the model are given in appendix 1.
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tax flows to depositors. A crucial distinction
between stockholders and depositors is readily
apparent: Depositors only receive Y, even if
income greatly exceeds promised payments.
On the other hand, if income is positive but in-
sufficient to meet promised payments, the bank
is in financial distress and incurs real costs that
reduce the return to depositors by the fraction k.
The bank is assumed to know 1) the relevant
tax rates, 2) the amount of nondebt tax shields,
3) the required capital-asset ratio, d, 4) the regu-
latory response, embodied in X, 5) the costs of
financial distress, 6) the average income, X, and
7) the standard deviation of income, (p. The bank
chooses Y to maximize the market value of its
debt plus equity (see appendix 1).
Equation (3) is the derivative of V with
respect to Y: V*(dV/dY).
(3)









where F() is the cumulative probability density
function of X. If banks in fact choose Y so as to
satisfy equation (3), then this expression indi-
cates how both market and regulatory forces
influence bank leverage.
If X = 0, the model's implications are consis-
tent with theories of optimal capital structure in
which the assumed tax advantage of debt bal-
ances the expected cost of bankruptcy (see BJK).
These implications are as follows. First, an in-
crease in t raises optimal leverage by increas-
ing the cost of equity. Analogous reasoning
implies that an increase in tpb reduces optimal
leverage. Second, an increase in tc raises opti-
mal leverage by increasing the tax advantage of
debt. For this reason, an increase in <p reduces op-
timal leverage by increasing the probability that
not all interest expenses will be deductible. Third,
an increase in k reduces optimal leverage by
increasing the expected cost of a bank's inability
to make all promised payments.
The model is also consistent with theoretical
approaches that assign deposit insurance a role
in distorting market discipline. The effect of fixed-
rate deposit insurance on optimal leverage can
be seen by comparing equation (3) with V*
under full insurance (see Osterberg and Thom-
son [1990]). Optimal leverage is higher with fixed-
rate deposit insurance by the amount (1 - t^)
[F{ Y) + kYf( Y) ]/r0. Fixed-rate deposit insur-
ance increases the optimal Y by insuring that
depositors are always paid in full and by shifting
the cost of financial distress from depositors to
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. In
the context of the model presented above, these
two influences are equivalent to assuming that
F(Y) = 0 and k= 0. Although this model does
not allow the higher leverage to influence bank
riskiness, the increase in leverage induced by
deposit insurance provides a rationale for capital
regulation.
The impact of capital regulation on leverage
can be seen by examining the last term in equa-
tion (3), X (• ). The first two components of
X (•) comprise the expected after-tax regulatory
penalty resulting from issuing the last dollar of
deposits. As equations (1) and (2) demonstrate,
the possibility of a regulatory penalty affects the
return to equity, which one would expect to be
reflected in the rate of return demanded by
stockholders and thus in the bank's leverage
decision. In fact, the last component of X ( •) is
the increase in the cost of equity capital that
results from issuing one more dollar of deposits,
Because all of the components are positive, the
possibility of a regulatory penalty reduces a
bank's optimal leverage.




Although equation (3) clearly shows that both
market forces and regulatory variables influence
leverage with signs consistent with theory, it is
more important for our purposes to note that
this expression also implies that the impact of
an increase in X (the regulatory penalty) on
leverage depends on market forces entering
X (•). Empirical studies of capital requirements
vary in their treatment of the influence of such
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a is the standard deviation of X) on Y.
To show how market influences affect the
impact of capital regulation on bank leverage,
one can differentiate the optimality condition
(equation [3D with respect to the regulatory vari-
ables. The derivatives with respect to the market-
force variables are indicated in appendix 2.
Further details can be found in Osterberg and
Thomson (1990). + (8 +
Equation (4) gives the impact of a change in
d on optimal leverage. The ratio d is closely
related to a required capital-asset ratio, because
it is the minimum level of the end-of-period (6) Vfa = -











The impact of d on leverage clearly depends
on market forces, implying that such forces in-
fluence leverage even if a bank fails to meet the
guidelines. As discussed below, some studies
imply that such banks are influenced only by
regulation, while banks meeting the guidelines
are influenced only by market forces. No such
dichotomy emerges here.
Equation (4) implies that V$d is negative
whenever X> Y+ (6 - 9 )/(l - tc); that is, an
increase in d reduces leverage when the bank
expects to meet the capital requirements. How-
ever, if a bank does not expect to meet the re-
quirements, an increase in d may induce it to
increase leverage and thus move even further
below the guidelines.
Equation (5) shows that an increase in the
regulatory penalty, A,, reduces bank leverage.
Here, as in the response of leverage to d, the
impact of capital regulation depends on market
factors. Equation (6) shows that an increase in
the costs of financial distress, k, also reduces
optimal leverage. Although k is referred to
above as a market factor, the cost of financial
distress can be influenced by regulatory policies
pertaining to bank closure.




Separating market forces from regulatory forces
has been a major difficulty in ascertaining the
effectiveness of capital guidelines. Dietrich and
James (1983) criticize earlier studies by Peltzman
(1970) and Mingo (1975) for ignoring deposit-
rate ceilings in their analyses of the impact of
capital requirements. Under such ceilings, banks
can influence risk-adjusted returns on bank debt
by augmenting capital. However, only under
less-than-full deposit insurance would more
capital benefit stockholders, by inducing unin-
sured depositors to accept lower interest rates.
Dietrich and James conclude that the guidelines
have no effect on bank capital changes.
Although the model presented here does not
directly consider the possibility of interest-rate ceil-
ings, capital levels influence the returns to stock-
holders and thus the rate of return required on
equity. The latter can be calculated as the ratio
between E{ Y ), the expected returns to stock-
holders, and S, the market value of equity (see
appendix 1 and BJK). Equation (1) indicates that
returns to stockholders are influenced by several
market forces that must be controlled for in any
analysis of the impact of capital requirements.
Marcus (1983), Wall and Peterson (1987), and
Keeley (1988a, 1988b) examine bank holding
companies rather than independent banks. Wall
and Peterson apply a switching regression tech-
nique to movemenLs of equity values in an attempt
to distinguish a regime in which capital ratios
exceed the requirements (and are thus influenced
by market forces) from a regime in which ratios
are at the regulatory limit. They conclude that
most banks are influenced by regulation.
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banks may respond to market forces even if the
guidelines are not being met and 2) regulatory
forces may influence leverage even if the bank
exceeds the guidelines. In addition, equation (4)
indicates that banks below the guidelines may
actually respond to stiffer requirements perversely.
Keeley (1988a) examines the response of
bank holding companies to the increased capital
requirements of the 1980s. Although capital-
deficient banks increased their book-value ratios
more than capital-sufficient banks did, market
ratios increased for both classes. However, regu-
latory subsidies or taxes can influence the
response of market-value ratios to increased capi-
tal guidelines, because the value of the subsidy
may vary with leverage or risk. Keeley (1988b)
claims that increased competition erodes the
value of bank charters and thus raises incentives
to increase leverage or to reduce capital ratios.
Marcus (1983) utilizes a time series cross-
sectional approach, measuring regulatory pres-
sure to increase capital by the holding company's
capital ratio relative to the average (in terms of
book or market value). He finds that the incen-
tive to decrease capital varies positively with the
level and variability of interest rates, as well as
with the tax disadvantage of equity finance.
Regulation seems to have no effect. However,
his regulatory measure does not incorporate risk.
In the model presented above, d is close to
a statutory capital-asset ratio. However, analyz-
ing banks' capital ratios relative to the average
may be a more useful way to isolate the impact
of capital regulation. There are at least two rea-
sons for this. First, relatively few banks are
below the statutory guidelines. Second, evi-
dence suggests that capital regulation is based
on a peer-group standard. In fact, a peer-group
capital standard may be a useful proxy for the
regulatory penalty variable, A,.
The relevance of taxes to the capital struc-
ture of banks is discussed in more detail by Wall
and Peterson (1988) and Gelfand and Hanweck
(1987). Wall and Peterson argue that taxes do
not influence the capital structure of banks affil-
iated with holding companies, because the tax
consequences of the parent issuing debt to buy
subsidiary equity are similar to those ensuing
when the bank itself issues debt. Gelfand and
Hanweck examine the financial statements of
11,000 banks and find strong evidence for mar-
ket influences (tax rates, risk, and municipal
securities [munis] as proxies for nondebt tax
shields) on leverage.
Osterberg and Thomson (1990) investigate
the influence of capital regulation on bank hold-
ing company leverage empirically, drawing on
the implications of the model presented above.
The authors find that market forces influence
leverage through three channels: a direct chan-
nel, a channel in which market forces interact
with risk ( a), and a channel in which market
forces interact with capital regulation. In addi-
tion, their analysis explicitly allows for the simul-
taneous determination of leverage and muni
holdings. Although the latter may no longer be
an important channel through which banks
manage their tax liability, this may not have
been the case during the period examined
(1986-1987).
6 The interactive capital regulation
measures, taken as a whole, are significant, as
are the interactive risk measures. In addition,
muni holdings appear to be significant deter-




This article reviews the literature relevant to assess-
ing the impact of increased bank capital require-
ments. Although researchers have suggested
various proposals to correct the distorted incen-
tives facing bankers, raising required capital ratios
continues to emerge as a possible means of
strengthening market discipline. However, pre-
vious studies have failed to clarify the impact of
numerical guidelines on banks' capital-asset ratios.
The primary difficulty in discerning the influ-
ence of such guidelines lies in disentangling the
impacts of regulatory and market forces. In
order to illustrate the way in which these forces
interact, I present a model of a bank's choice of
leverage ratio where, in the absence of capital
regulation, tax considerations and bankruptcy
costs imply an interior solution. When capital
regulation is introduced, it becomes clear that
the impact of such regulation depends on
market forces.
These results may provide useful insight for
regulators. For example, the response of bank
leverage to capital regulation may depend on
• 6 Scholes, Wilson, and Wolfson (1990) present evidence that
banks' muni holdings responded to changes in the tax code between
1983 and 1987, and that capital regulation seemed to influence banks'
timing ot capital loss realization. This seems to suggest that capital




Best available copythe market factors considered in this paper, such
as tax rates, nondebt tax shields, and muni hold-
ings, not just on the capital position of the bank.
This implies that evaluations of banks' leverage
and capital-asset ratios should take into account
market influences on the leverage decision.
The model may also explain previous empiri-
cal findings regarding the impact of capital
requirements. Most studies do not control for
many of the market influences on banks' capital
decisions. The analysis presented here thus
implies that theoretical examinations of bank
capital structure may further improve our under-
standing of the influence of capital require-
ments. In this regard, it may be particularly
useful to analyze capital requirements through
models that incorporate informational asymme-
tries and market imperfections to explain the






The main assumptions of the model presented
in the text are as follows:
1. Investors are risk-neutral.
2. The personal tax rates on returns from
bank debt and bank equity are Lb and t ,
respectively.
3. Bank income is taxed at the corporate
rate, tc.
4. All taxes are levied on end-of-period
wealth.
5. The firm's end-of-period tax liability can
be reduced through nondebt tax shields, (p ,
such as investment tax credits and depreciation.
6. Unused tax credits cannot be transferred
across time or across firms.
7. If banks cannot meet their end-of-period
promised payments to depositors, Y, costs of
financial distress are incurred that reduce bank
equity value by a factor of k.
8. The end-of-period capital requirement is
5= Yd.
9. If X- Y< (8 - cp )/l - tc), a regulatory
penalty reduces stockholders' returns by a con-
stant fraction A, ( X is the end-of-period value of
assets).
10. All bank liabilities are uninsured
deposits.
11. The capital constraint, 8 , is not binding
unless X is such that the tax shields are being
fully utilized.
Assumption 10 allows us to separate the ef-
fects of capital requirements from the effects of
deposit insurance. Thomson (1987) shows that
this is equivalent to assuming 100 percent deposit
insurance if the insurance is fairly priced. The
case in which all liabilities are covered by fixed-
rate, zero-premium deposit insurance is analyzed
in appendix A of Osterberg and Thomson (1990).
Assumption 11 is made for convenience only;
my results are not materially affected by the al-
ternative assumption that 8 is binding for values
of X where 9 > (X- Y) tc.
Under the assumption of risk neutrality, and
given the uncertain outcomes detailed in the
text, the after-tax market value of the banking














where f(X) = the probability density of X,
and r0 = one plus the rate of return on a risk-
free tax-exempt bond.
The four integrals in equation (1A) are,
respectively, 1) the expected value of the bank
over the range of X where the bank fully utilizes
its nondebt tax shields, 2) the expected value of
the regulatory tax over the range of X where the
bank fully utilizes its nondebt tax shields but fails
to meet its capital guideline, 3)'the expected
value of the bank over the range of X where
nondebt tax shields are no longer fully utilized,
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is not large enough to meet promised payments
to the depositors and k percent of the firm value






The effect of an increase in nondebt tax shields,





when X > Y + (8 - (p )/(l - tc) arises be-
cause the capital constraint is assumed to be
binding when the bank's net tax bill is positive.
There are two offsetting effects. First, an in-
crease in tc raises the value of the interest
deduction on debt, which induces the bank to
issue more deposits. This is the familiar effect
discussed in the finance literature on optimal
capital structure for nonfinancial entities. The
second effect is a reduction in the after-tax
value of equity and an associated increase in
the probability that the bank will violate the
capital constraint and reduce leverage.
(3A)




1- t,. c c
d X (8 - (p) x
If there were no regulatory penalty ( X = 0 ),
I would obtain the same results as BJK; that is, a
higher level of nondebt tax shields would
reduce leverage (Vp < 0). Here, however, lev-
erage increases if X > Y + ( 8 - (p )/( 1 - tc).
This possibility is created by the combination of
the capital requirement being based on the after-
tax value of equity, which includes the value of
the shields, and the fact that the capital require-
ment is binding when the tax shields are being
fully utilized. For high-enough values of X, an
additional dollar of tax shields reduces the prob-
ability that the bank will violate the capital con-
straint and incur the regulatory penalty.
The effects of changes in the various tax
rates on the optimal level of debt are shown in
equations (3A), (4A), and (5A). In equation
(3A), the response of bank leverage to an in-
crease in the marginal corporate tax rate is posi-
tive when X > Y + (8 - (p)/(l - tc). In other
words, if expected end-of-period income is
large enough to meet the capital requirements,
then an increase in tc reduces the optimal level
of debt. The ambiguous sign for equation (3A)
8-
>
If there were no costs of financial distress
(k = 0), equation (4A) would be unambiguously
negative at the optimal level of debt. In addition,
if all of the bank's deposits were insured,
Vis, would be clearly negative. However, more
pb
generally, equation (4A) is negative when the
probability that Y is less than X exceeds the
marginal expected leverage-related costs. This
result is similar to the findings of BJK. Note that
we have assumed that the costs of financial dis-
tress facing the depositors (k ) are distinct from
the regulatory penalty. As in BJK, Vb, is unam-
biguously positive. However, here the response















Finally, the optimal level of deposits is a func-
tion of the variability of X. Equation (6A) shows
that an increase in a has an ambiguous effect
on optimal leverage. The sign on Vpa depends
on the proximity of Y, Y + (8 - (p ) /(I - tc),
and Y+ ty/tc to the mean of X, as well as on
the magnitudes of k, (p, d, and X. BJK find that,
even without a regulatory penalty, the impact of
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